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DISPLACED PERSONS: "THE NEW REFUGEES"
I. INTRODUCTION
The Refugee Act of 19801 established a comprehensive statutory
scheme to deal with the refugee problem in the United States, re-
placing a patchwork of legislation promulgated in response to each
new refugee crisis.2 Although laudatory in many respects,s the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980 has proven inadequate in the face of mass in-
fluxes of refugees seeking asylum." Recently, legislation was intro-
duced in Congress which would establish streamlined statutory
procedures tailored to accommodate large groups of asylum-seek-
ers.5 Unfortunately, both the Refugee Act of 1980 and the recent
' Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 22 U.S.C.).
2 CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, 96TH CONG., 2 D SEsS., REVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE REsENrTrmwr
PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 35 (Comm. Print 1980)[hereinafter cited as REvIEw OF REFUGEE
PROGRAMS]. See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION LAW AND POLICY (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PoLIcY].
• See infra text accompanying notes 102-108.
' Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
has observed:
There is a strong consensus of opinion in Congress and in the Administration that
the present asylum system, which was instituted by the Refugee Act of 1980, has
been shown to be seriously defective. The defects that have come to light since the
enactment of the Refugee Act are not the result of any miadrafting, or misdirec-
tion; they are simply the result of a quantum leap in the number of persons who
have applied for asylum. At the time of this hearing, there are approximately
73,000 asylum applications pending before the Immigration and Naturalization
Service exclusive of those received from Cuban and Haitian boat arrivals. New
applications are filed at the rate of 2,500 per month.
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and
the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 395 (1982); see also Asylum Adjudication: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1981)(prepared statement of Doris Meissner, Acting Commissioner, Im-
migration and Naturalization Service).
I The most recent legislative proposal introduced in Congress was the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1983, S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. (1983); H.R. 1510, 98th Cong.,
1st Seas. (1983)[hereinafter cited as 1983 Reform Act]. The Senate passed an amended ver-
sion of the 1983 Reform Act on May 18, 1983, by a vote of 77 to 18 with 5 abstentions. 129
CONG. REC. S6969-70 (daily ed. May 18, 1983). For the text of the amended bill, see id. at
S6970-86. In the House, the Judiciary, Agriculture, and Education and Labor Committees
reported favorably on the legislation. H.R. REP. No. 115, pts. 1-2, 4, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983). No action was taken on the House version of the bill during the first session of the
98th Congress. The Speaker of the House, Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., explained that he did not
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legislative proposals ignore the plight of persons in the United
States who are seeking refuge from civil strife within their home-
land. Various terms have been used to describe these individuals;
in this Paper, they will be called displaced persons.e Unlike con-
ventional refugees who are fleeing from an individualized threat of
want to bring the bill to the floor of the House because it was opposed by many Hispanic
Americans and there was no clear constituency in favor of the legislation. N.Y. Times, Oct.
5, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
The 1983 Reform Act is identical to the Immigration and Reform Act of 1982, S. 2222,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 5872, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982
Reform Act]. The Senate passed the 1982 Reform Act on August 17, 1982, by a vote of 80 to
19. 128 CONG. REC. S10,618-19 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1982). However, the bill failed to clear the
House of Representatives due to a lack of time during the post-election session. For an
analysis of the 1982 Reform Act, see Recent Development, Immigration Law: Control of
Immigration into the United States, 23 HA]v. Ihr'L L.J. 410 (1983); Note, U.S. Immigra-
tion and Reform: A Critical Evaluation, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 805 (1982); see also S. REP. No.
485, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. REP. No. 890, pts. 1 and 2, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982). The 1983 Reform Act incorporated many of the provisions of the Omnibus Immigra-
tion Control Act of 1981 which was introduced by the Reagan administration in 1981. S.
1765, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S11,993 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981); H.R. 4382, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. 1981). For a section-by-section analysis of this 1981 proposal, see
127 CONG. REC. S12,065 (daily ad. Oct. 23, 1981); see also Meissner, Proposed Revisions in
Asylum Procedures and Law, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE REP. 1 (Spring, Sum-
mer, Fall, 1981).
' The terms which have been used to describe these persons include: "displaced persons,"
"illegal immigrants," "quasi-refugees," "aliens," "departees," "boat people," "stowaways,"
and "de facto refugees." See Goodwin-Gill, Entry and Exclusion of Refugees, in TRANSNA-
TIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 291, 302 (1982); COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES OF THE WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW CENTER, TOWARDS THE
SECOND QUAAITER CENTURY OF REFUGEE LAW 57-60 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TowARDs THE
SECOND QUARTER CENTURY]. In 1976, the United Nations Economic and Social Council de-
fined displaced persons as "victims of man-made disasters, requiring urgent humanitarian
assistance." E.S.C. Res. 2011, 61 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 2, U.N. Doc. E/5889 (1976).
This definition was subsequently endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. See
G.A. Res. 31/35, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 94, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976). In discuss-
ing the distinction between refugees and displaced persons, the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated:
Judging from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, a displaced person
would appear to be one who, while not fulfilling strictu sensu the refugee eligibil-
ity criteria, is in a situation analogous to that of a refugee. Additionally, it is felt
by some that persons who do not cross an internationally recognized border
should be treated as displaced persons. Here again, there is need for clarification.
Addendum to the Report of the UNHCR, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12A) at 33-34, U.N.
Doc. A/32/12/Add.1 (1977); see also U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/588 (1980)(the UNHCR stated that
"[d]isplaced persons may be uprooted within their countries or cross an international bor-
der, and the causes for uprooting may be natural, man-made, or both"). See generally
Muntarbhorn, Determination of the Status of Refugees: Definition in Context, in SYMPO-
SIUM ON THE PROMOTION, DISSEMINATION AND TEACHING OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS OF
REFUGEES 83 (1981). For the purpose of this Paper the term "displaced persons" embraces
those who have been uprooted within their own countries and those who have crossed na-
tional borders due to man-made disasters such as civil war.
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persecution, displaced persons are escaping widespread conditions
of civil violence.'
This distinction between targeted persecution and indiscrimi-
nate violence places displaced persons in a dubious position under
United States law because they are not included within the statu-
tory definition of refugee.' In the absence of explicit statutory
For a more detailed discussion of this distinction, see infra notes 50-53 and accompany-
ing text.
8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(Supp. V 1981). A refugee is defined as:
(A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or
(B) in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate consulta-
tion . . may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's na-
tionality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in
which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Id. Excluded from this definition are persons "who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id.
Illustrating the limitations of this definition when applied in the context of recent refugee
crises, Senator Alan K. Simpson stated:
The statute says "persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group or political opinion." That is all it says. So a
country can be exceedingly dangerous and perilous for human beings and in no
case would that qualify the people leaving that country as refugees under U.S.
law. I think that it is very critical to keep this in mind, and each time I hear the
phrase "persecution" I am going to refer back to the statute, and hope others will,
and read exactly what it says. So it is going to be an interesting few months.
United States as a Country of Mass First Asylum: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Mass Asy-
lum]. In another vivid comment on the language of the definition, Senator Simpson stated
that "it really does not say that you can include a person in the definition of refugee who is
just scared to death of his country or the turmoil in his country." Id. at 116.
These concerns over the restrictive language of the refugee definition are not abstract;
rather, they stem from application of this definition in practice by the State Department.
Mr. Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, stated:
There is an insurgency in [El Salvador] which has resulted in civilian deaths
* as well as deaths of the combatants. It has made people homeless, also. But it
is our business to determine whether the individual applicant Salvadoran who is
here in the United States illegally and applies for asylum is likely to be subject to
persecution or not. And on a case-by-case basis the judgment has been largely,
very largely that they are not. . ..
Undoubtedly it is true that El Salvador is for many El Salvadorans a dangerous
country to live in. But their situation is not different from that of other El
Salvadorans.
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guidance, the decision of whether to grant refuge to displaced per-
sons may be reached on the basis of a policy which fails to reflect
the humanitarian underpinnings of refugee law.9 Denial of asy-
lum"0 or temporary refuge 1 may lead to suggestions that the
United States is ignoring its international treaty obligations to-
ward refugees. 2
This Paper will focus upon the position of persons within the
United States seeking refuge from civil strife within their country
of origin. To place the problem in the appropriate context, the ob-
ligations imposed upon the United States by international refugee
treaties will be discussed. The evolution of refugee law outside the
framework of these instruments will then be examined, particu-
larly insofar as these developments evidence a trend toward ex-
tending protection and assistance to displaced persons. For this
purpose, the activities of the major international refugee organiza-
Id. at 29-30.
9 See Letter from Alvin P. Drieschler, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Rela-
tions, State Department, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Apr. 17, 1981), reprinted in 128
CONG. REC. S831 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982). The State Department refused to grant asylum or
voluntary departure status to Salvadorans in lieu of forcible repatriation. The primary rea-
son advanced was that "[w]hile civil strife and violence in El Salvador continue at distres-
sing levels, conditions there do not, at present, warrant the granting of blanket voluntary
departure to Salvadorans in the United States." Id. This policy has been characterized as "a
systematic practice designed to forecibly [sic] return Salvadorans irrespective of the merits
of their claims." Interoffice Memorandum from K. Kalumiya, Legal Officer, to M.P. Mous-
salli, Director of Protection, UNHCR, Geneva (Oct. 16, 1981), reprinted in 128 CONG. REC.
S827 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982)[hereinafter cited as UNHCR Memorandum]. See generally
Hanson, Behind the Paper Curtain: Asylum Policy Versus Asylum Practice, 7 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 107 (1978).
10 Asylum is the "protection accorded by a State in its territory or at some other place
subject to certain of its organs to an individual who comes to seek it." 43(11) ANNUAIRE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 376 (1950)(translated in A. GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 1
(1980)). Asylum given to persons within a state's territory is generally referred to as "terri-
torial asylum." Asylum given in other places, such as on the premises of an embassy, is
commonly referred to as "diplomatic asylum." Id.
11 Temporary refuge is the temporary protection accorded an individual pending arrange-
ments for a durable solution. See Addendum to the Report of the UNHCR, 36 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 12A) at 18, U.N. Doc. A/36/12/Add.1 (1981); see also infra notes 76-82 and ac-
companying text.
" UNHCR Memorandum, supra note 9, at S831. After an extensive review of the situa-
tion of Salvadorans within the United States, representatives of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recommended that:
UNHCR continue to express its concern to the U.S. Government that its apparent
failure to grant asylum to any significant number of Salvadorans, coupled with
continuing large-scale forcible and voluntary return to El Salvador, would appear
to represent a negation of its responsibilities assumed upon its adherence to the
[1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees].
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tion, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees (UNHCR), and a regional organization, the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), will be canvassed in an effort to identify
emerging norms in the treatment of displaced persons. The protec-
tion accorded displaced persons by United States refugee law will
be reviewed against this backdrop; the inquiry will center upon the
alternative forms of protection available to displaced persons
within the United States. The problem of displaced persons will
also be considered in the context of the policies which underlie
United States refugee law. Finally, several recommendations for
reform of the current law are offered.
II. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
A. International Treaties
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951
Convention)1" is the primary source of international obligations to-
ward refugees.1 4 The scope of the 1951 Convention is limited: only
persons who became refugees due to events occurring before Janu-
ary 1, 1951 are explicitly covered by its provisions. 5 The harsh im-
plications of this dateline became apparent as new refugee crises
emerged in Africa during the 1960's which could not be considered
as arising from events occurring before 1951, given even a liberal
interpretation of the dateline. 6 The dateline also created a dis-
" Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [herein-
after cited as 1951 Convention].
14 For a concise analysis of the 1951 Convention, see Weis, Legal Aspects of the Coven-
tion of 25 July 1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 478 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Weis, Legal Aspects of 1951 Convention]. For a discussion of the 1951
Convention in the context of contemporary international refugee law, see Weis, The Inter-
national Protection of Refugees, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 193 (1954).
"6 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 1A(2). This dateline was included in the 1951
Convention because the drafters felt that it would be difficult for states to undertake bind-
ing commitments toward future refugees. 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 170-71 (1966).
The 1951 Convention also contains an optional geographical limitation: the term "events
occurring before 1 January 1951" could mean either (a) "events occurring in Europe before
1 January 1951"; or (b) "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951."
1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 1B(1)(a)-(b).
"6 The drafters were aware that problems might arise as a result of the limitations im-
posed on the coverage of the 1951 Convention. In a recommendation adopted in the Final
Act, the drafters expressed the hope that the 1951 Convention "will have value as an exam-
ple exceeding its contractual scope and that all nations will be guided by it in granting so far
as possible to persons in their territory as refugees and who would not be covered by the
terms of the Convention, the treatment for which it provides." Final Act of the 1951 United
Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons,
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crepancy between the coverage of the 1951 Convention and the
personal jurisdiction of the UNHCR, the primary international or-
gan charged with the protection of refugees. 17 The need to elimi-
nate this jurisdictional gap and to extend the temporal scope of the
1951 Convention led to the adoption of the 1967 Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol)' 8 which lifts the dateline
and incorporates by reference the remaining provisions of the 1951
Convention. 9 Although not a party to the 1951 Convention, the
United States undertook to apply its substantive provisions by ad-
hering to the 1967 Protocol in 1968.2
The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol seek to ensure the
basic rights of refugees within the country of refuge, including
matters involving religion,2 ' personal status,2 property, s freedom
of association,24 access to the courts, 8 employment,26 housing,27 ed-
ucation, 8 welfare,2" and freedom of movement.30 States are urged
to admit refugees in a spirit of international cooperation.3s How-
Recommendation E, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 148 [hereinafter cited as Final Act].
17 The personal jurisdiction of the UNHCR is not restricted by a dateline. See infra note
58.
18 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter cited as 1967 Protocol]. The Protocol is of a dual
nature: it supplements the 1951 Convention for states which are parties to that instrument,
and it constitutes an independent multilateral treaty for states which are not parties to the
Convention. Weis, The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and Some Ques-
tions of the Law of Treaties, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 39, 50 (1967).
19 1967 Protocol, supra note 18, art. I, paras. 1-2. The optional geographical limitation
was retained in the 1967 Protocol only for those states which had invoked the restriction
when signing the 1951 Convention. Id. para. 3.
2" The 1967 Protocol came into force with respect to the United States on November 1,
1968. Treaty Information, 59 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 535, 536 (1968).
21 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 4.
22 Id. art. 12.
23 Id. arts. 13-14.
24 Id. art. 15.
28 Id. art. 16.
26 Id. arts. 17-19.
27 Id. art. 21.
28 Id. art. 22.
" Id. arts. 23-24.
30 Id. art, 26.
21 See id. preamble ("the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain
countries, and . . . a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has
recognized the international scope and nature cannot be achieved without international co-
operation."); Final Act, supra note 16, Recommendation D, 189 U.N.T.S. at 146, 148 (rec-
ommending "that Governments continue to receive refugees in their territories and that
they act in concert in a true spirit of international co-operation in order that these refugees
may find asylum and the possibility of resettlement").
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ever, neither instrument obliges states to admit refugees, thus af-
firming the traditional notion that the right to asylum inures in
favor of the state rather than the individual.2 Recent attempts to
confer a right to asylum on the individual have weakened, but not
displaced, this traditional view.S3Although the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol do not create a right to asylum, they impose
some limits on the discretion of a state in denying its sanctuary to
aliens who are already within the state's borders.3 4 Article 31 pros-
cribes the imposition of penalties for illegal entry on refugees who
are coming directly from a country where their life or freedom was
threatened, provided they report to the authorities without delay
and show good cause for their illegal entry. 5 Moreover, refugees
unlawfully within the country of refuge must be given a reasonable
time and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission to another
country in the event that their status is not regularized in the
country of refuge. 6 Article 32 prohibits the expulsion of refugees
lawfully within a state's territory except for reasons of national se-
curity or to preserve public order.3 7 The refugee must be accorded
due process of law in any expulsion proceeding, and the refugee
must be permitted a hearing and appeal against an order of expul-
sion. The principle of non-refoulement, enshrined in article 33,
32 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 10, at 42-43; Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 26
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 327, 335 (1949).
" The original draft of article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads as
follows: "Everyone has the right to seek and be granted in other countries asylum from
persecution." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/285/Rev.1 (1948). The words "be granted" were replaced by
the words "to enjoy" in the final text. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 74 (1948). Thus, the final text of article 14 does not impose
an obligation on states to grant asylum; however, it has been noted that "the express recog-
nition of asylum as a human right is important enough." 2 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS
OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101-02 (1972).
The 1967 United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum proclaims in article 3(1) that
"no person ... shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier or, if he has
already entered the territory in which he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to
any State where he may be subjected to persecution." G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967). This provision does not create a positive duty to
grant asylum since the asylum-seeker may be sent to a third country. Weis, The United
Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 92, 142 (1969). Neither of
these instruments is of a binding character and, therefore, "the right to gain admission to a
country still belongs to the moral sphere." 2 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra, at 108; see also M.
GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 120-44 (1956).
See generally 2 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 33, at 435-43.
'B 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 31(1).
Id. art. 31(2).
37 Id. art. 32(1).
Id. art. 32(2). The hearing and appeal against an order of expulsion may be denied only
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prohibits the expulsion or return (refoulement) of a refugee to a
country where his life or freedom would be threatened due to race,
religion, social group, or political opinion. This article applies
only to those already within the state's territory,40 and it does not
proscribe expulsion to a country where there is no risk of persecu-
tion.' 1  The non-refoulement provision protects all refugees,
whether lawfully or unlawfully within the country of refuge,' 2 but
it does not apply to those who have been convicted of a serious
crime or who present a danger to the country's security.43
The applicability of the non-refoulement provision is restricted
to persons who are "refugees" under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol. 4 These instruments define "refugee" as any person
who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside his country of nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former, habitual residence. . . is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.'5
This definition was formulated by Western countries at the height
of the Cold War, a time when refugees came almost exclusively
from East European states.' 6 West European states, the countries
for compelling reasons of national security. The refugee must also be given "a reasonable
period within which to seek legal admission into another country." Id. art. 32(3).
39 Id. art. 33(1). States parties to the 1951 Convention may not make any reservation to
this article. Id. art. 42.
40 2 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 33, at 94; see also Weis, Legal Aspects of 1951 Con-
vention, supra note 14, at 482. It has been argued that the principle of non-refoulement
forbids rejection at the frontier, particularly in light of recent state practice. At present, this
interpretation remains persuasive and does not appear to displace the narrower reading of
article 33. Cf. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 6, at 302-04; S. SINHA, AsYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 111 (1971); 2 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 33, at 94-98.
" Cf. 1951 Convention, supra note 13, arts. 31(2), 32(3) (states must allow refugees a
reasonable period and all necessary facilities to obtain admission to another country).
42 Even if found to be subject to expulsion under article 32, article 33 prohibits expulsion
to a place where the refugee will be subject to persecution. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 6,
at 300.
40 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 33(2).
44 2 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 33, at 94.
45 1951 Convention, supra note 13, art. 1A(2). For a comprehensive discussion of the vari-
ous elements of this definition, see 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 15, at 142-304.
46 Melander, The Protection of Refugees, 18 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 151, 160 (1974). East
European countries were engaged in a boycott of the United Nations at the time this provi-
sion was drafted. Id.
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of asylum, had no difficulty in classifying these persons as refugees
in light of the poor East-West relations prevailing at the time.4 7
Changes in the nature and causes of refugee movements since
the post-war era have revealed the limitations of this definition of
refugee. 8 The definition requires an individualized screening of
each applicant for refugee status, erecting a procedural barrier
which impedes efforts to extend protection and assistance to large
groups of refugees. 49 The conventional definition of refugee also
neglects the dilemma of persons displaced by civil war and natural
disasters.50 These groups are in a situation analogous to that of
persons covered by the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, yet
they cannot ascribe their flight to a fear of persecution "for reasons
of race, nationality, membership of a particular social group or po-
litical opinion." This limitation on the scope of the conventional
definition of refugee is perhaps best explained by the notion that
"the bombs will cease falling, the floods will recede, but persecu-
tion is implacable."'" Thus, displaced persons are denied the pro-
'7 Id. at 161.
See generally Plender, Admission of Refugees: Draft Convention on Territorial Asy-
lum, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 45, 54-55 (1977); Fragomen, The Refugee: A Problem of Defini-
tion, 3 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 45, 57-58 (1970).
" See Sadruddin Aga Khan, Legal Problems Relating to Refugees and Displaced Per-
sons, 149 RECUEIL DES COURS 287, 339-40 (1976); see also infra note 59 (briefly reviewing the
elements involved in the screening process).
"0 For a review of the treatment accorded victims of natural calamities under United
States refugee law, see Parker, Victims of Natural Disasters in U.S. Refugee Law and Pol-
icy, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES, MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 137
(1982).
"' Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES, MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91, 101 (1982). This idea is consistent
with the legal principle upon which the conventional definition of refugee is based. Accord-
ing to this principle, when the normal bond of trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance be-
tween an individual and his state has been ruptured by a political controversy, the individ-
ual is denied the diplomatic and consular protection which a state normally accords its
nationals abroad. 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 15, at 74-79; Sadruddin Aga Khan, supra
note 49, at 329. Thus, the individual needs international protection when he is outside his
country of origin. Id. The grounds of persecution enumerated in the conventional definition
of refugee are criteria to be used in determining whether the individual stands in need of
refugee status and its concomitant protection due to a break in the normal relationship
between the individual and his state. In the case of displaced persons, this relationship has
not been broken because a political controversy does not exist. Rather, the displaced person
is simply temporarily separated from his place of origin by conditions of violence. Although
he may temporarily be deprived of the protection normally accorded to him by his state,
there is no permanent rupture of the relationship between the displaced person and his
state and, thus, there is no need for international protection. It has been observed that:
[sluch reasoning. . . may be appropriate for the purpose of determining whether
an individual should receive an international travel document and should be eligi-
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tection of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol because they
are only temporarily uprooted and, when the conflict ceases, will
be more likely to return to their place of origin to rebuild their
lives. 52 Added to the logical appeal of this approach is the practical
advantage that it offers to states which seek a means of limiting
the influx of displaced persons seeking resettlement opportuni-
ties. 53 However, this limited conception of the term "refugee" de-
nies any protection or assistance to displaced persons, even while
the bombs are still falling. Inconsistent with the humanitarian un-
derpinnings of refugee law, this result has prompted efforts to cre-
ate a legal framework designed to overcome the shortcomings of
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol and to allow a more
flexible response to modern refugee crises.
B. Evolution of International Refugee Law
1. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR), established in 1950," is the primary international
organ entrusted with the protection of refugees.55 The UNHCR is
responsible for providing international protection for refugees and
seeking permanent solutions to their problems by means of volun-
tary repatriation or assimilation within new national communi-
ties.50 The work of the UNHCR is declared to be of a humanitarian
ble for the diplomatic protection afforded by [the UNHCRJ; however, it appears
inappropriate for the purpose of determining whether an applicant qualifies for
admission to a country of asylum and freedom from refoulement.
Plender, supra note 48, at 54.
5' Martin, supra note 51, at 101.
53 Id.
G.A. Res. 428, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). At the
previous session, the United Nations General Assembly decided to establish the UNHCR.
G.A. Res. 319, U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 36 (1949).
The UNHCR, a subsidiary organ under article 22 of the United Nations Charter, is not
a permanent institution. The mandate of the UNHCR is reviewed every five years; it was
most recently renewed through December 31, 1983. G.A. Res. 32/68, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 45) at 140, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977).
" Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res.
428, Annex, para. 1, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/t775 (1950) [hereinaf-
ter cited as UNHCR Statute]. Paragraph 8 of the UNHCR Statute sets forth a detailed list
of the UNHCR's responsibilities in the area of international protection. For a discussion of
issues which have recently been addressed by the UNHCR in the field of international pro-
tection, see Report of the UNHCR, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 3-15, U.N. Doc. A/37/
12 (1982). The functions of the UNHCR with respect to voluntary repatriation are "consid-
ered to include not only assistance prior to repatriation but also the ensuring of adequate
reception facilities and measures for rehabilitation once refugees have returned to their
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and entirely non-political character." Under the Statute of the
UNHCR (UNHCR Statute), the persons entitled to assistance
from the UNHCR are essentially the same as those covered by the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.s8 Strictly construed, the
UNHCR Statute's definition of refugee calls for an individualized
determination of eligibility for refugee status based upon an evalu-
ation of the subjective and objective elements necessary to estab-
lish a well-founded fear of persecution. 9
During the past thirty years, the jurisdiction of the UNHCR has
been extended in piecemeal fashion beyond the confines of the
UNHCR Statute to embrace new categories of refugees.6 0 The first
home country." Report of the UNHCR, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 12, U.N. Doc. A/
36/12 (1981). Assimilation refers to the absorption of refugees by the country of first asylum
(local integration) or by another country (resettlement). Sadruddin Aga Khan, supra note
49, at 336.
57 UNHCR Statute, supra note 56, para. 2. In practice, the UNHCR has been obliged to
maneuver in the political arena to accomplish its mission; however, emphasis upon the non-
political nature of its work insulates the UNHCR from political controversy and explains
the unwillingness of the UNHCR to assess blame for refugee flows. See Martin, Large-Scale
Migrations of Asylum Seekers, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 598-99 (1982).
" Compare UNHCR Statute, supra note 56, para. 6 with 1951 Convention, supra note
13, art. 1 and 1967 Protocol, supra note 18, art. 1, paras. 2-3. The UNHCR Statute estab-
lishes two categories of refugees within the competence of the UNHCR. The first category is
composed of persons considered to be refugees under previous agreements concluded under
the League of Nations or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization.
UNHCR Statute, supra note 56, para. 6A(i). The second category is composed of persons
who, as a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951, are outside their country of
origin and are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of its protection owing to a well-
founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion. Id.
para. 6A(ii). The UNHCR Statute proceeds to eliminate the dateline with respect to this
second category of refugees, creating a definition which is broader than that of the 1951
Convention. Id. para. 6B. For a detailed comparison of the definition set forth in the
UNHCR Statute with that contained in the 1951 Convention, see 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN,
supra note 15, at 103-08, 305-09 (1966).
" The subjective element requires that the fear be well-founded in the sense that it is
sincere and reasonable rather than feigned or imaginary. Melander, supra note 46, at 158.
From a logistical standpoint, the need to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on an
individualized, subjective basis restricts the UNHCR's ability to aid large groups of refu-
gees. Id. at 161. This is especially the case in developing countries where the lack of admin-
istrative machinery renders impracticable a procedure for determining the individual eligi-
bility of large groups of refugees. Sadruddin Aga Khan, supra note 49, at 340; see also infra
note 86.
The objective element requires a detached evaluation of the situation in the applicant's
home country to establish that there is a plausible danger of persecution. Melander, supra
note 46, at 158. See generally 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 15, at 173-88. The objective
element hinders the UNHCR's activities since the evaluation of political conditions in the
country of origin may lead to tension between that country and the UNHCR. Melander,
supra note 46, at 159.
o The United Nations General Assembly (General Assembly) and the Economic and So-
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step in this direction was the gradual development of the concept
of the UNHCR's "good offices," which allowed the UNHCR to as-
sist refugees who were not clearly within the purview of the
UNHCR Statute.61 Initially, the UNHCR was only authorized to
lend its "good offices" to designated groups of refugees for the lim-
ited purpose of transmitting financial contributions.62 Subsequent
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (General As-
sembly) broadened the notion of the UNHCR's "good offices" by
authorizing a wider range of activities on behalf of any group of
refugees not within the UNHCR's statutory jurisdiction."
cial Council may give new authority to the UNHCR to undertake specific tasks or to extend
its regular activities to new groups of refugees. See UNHCR Statute, supra note 56, para. 3
("[tihe High Commissioner shall follow policy directives given him by the General Assembly
or the Economic and Social Council").
1 In conventional parlance, the term "good offices" refers to a mode of effecting the pa-
cific settlement of a dispute. A third party offers its "good offices" when it tries to induce
the disputing parties to decide the quarrel for themselves; the third-party intermediary's
offer of its good offices is not to be regarded as an unfriendly act. J. BRRLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 373 (6th ed. 1963). The UNHCR developed a "good offices" procedure which incor-
porates the flexible and nonpartisan attributes of the traditional device. The "good offices"
procedure has enabled the UNHCR to depart from the strict terms of the UNHCR Statute
in several situations: "1) where groups not clearly within the definition of refugee were in
dire need of material assistance; 2) where it was impossible or impolitic to categorize a
needy group as refugees because it implied the censure of a powerful government; and 3)
where international action of a kind not explicitly authorized to the High Commissioner by
his Statute was needed." TOWARDS THE SECOND QUARTER CENTURY, supra note 6, at 53. See
generally Sadruddin Aga Khan, supra note 49, at 338-42; Melander, supra note 46, at 161-
66; 1 L. HOLBORN, REFUGEES: A PROBLEM OF OUR TIME 434-49 (1975); Schnyder, Les Aspects
Juridiques Actuels du Problme des R~fugiks, 114 RECUEIL DES COURS 335, 429 (1965).
62 The first reference to the "good offices" concept appeared in the resolution of the Gen-
eral Assembly which authorized the UNHCR "to use his good offices to encourage arrange-
ments for contributions" to Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. G.A. Res. 1167, 12 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 18) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957).
Collective determination of eligibility for refugee status was first employed during the
1956 Hungarian crisis when 20,000 Hungarians fled in the wake of Soviet intervention. In an
emergency session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-
General to call upon the UNHCR "to consult with other appropriate international agencies
and interested Governments with a view to making speedy and effective arrangements for
emergency assistance to refugees from Hungary." G.A. Res. 1006, 2d Emergency Sess. Supp.
(No. 1) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/3355 (1956). The assistance, which was extended to nearly 180,000
Algerians fleeing the war of liberation in their homeland, was also condoned by the General
Assembly, although there was no explicit reference to the UNHCR's "good offices." G.A.
Res. 1286, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
03 In 1959, the General Assembly authorized the UNHCR "in respect of refugees who do
not come within the competence of the United Nations, to use his offices in the transmission
of contributions designed to provide assistance to these refugees." G.A. Res. 1388, 14 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); see also G.A. Res. 1499, 15 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960)(urging states to continue to consult
with the UNHCR regarding assistance "to groups of refugees who do not come within the
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By 1961, the "good offices" concept was firmly established."' It
represented a departure from the individualistic concept of refugee
embodied in the UNHCR Statute and the 1951 Convention, sup-
plying a flexible legal framework able to accommodate new catego-
ries of refugees. 8 Apart from broadening the operative definition
of refugee, the "good offices" device allowed the UNHCR to make
a group determination of eligibility for aid in cases where the large
number of refugees rendered impracticable the establishment of a
well-founded fear of persecution on an individual basis as required
by the UNHCR Statute.6 6 During the 1960's, this collective ap-
proach was used extensively in Africa since it enabled the UNHCR
to provide timely assistance to large groups of refugees without
having to make an assessment of the political conditions prevailing
in the country of origin. 7 In 1965, the "good offices" function was
integrated into the regular activities of the UNHCR, establishing a
unified responsibility for refugees covered by the UNHCR's good
offices and those covered under the terms of the UNHCR Stat-
ute.6 The position of African refugees under the aegis of the
competence of the United Nations").
In 1961, the General Assembly noted with satisfaction "the efforts made by the High
Commissioner in his various fields of activity for groups of refugees for whom he lends his
good offices" and requested the UNHCR "to pursue his activities on behalf of the refugees
within his mandate or those for whom he extends his good offices." G.A. Res. 1673, 16 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 28, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). This resolution brought the "good
offices" concept within the scope of the UNHCR's normal activities. Schnyder, supra note
61, at 435. Also, the resolution represents a departure from earlier resolutions since it does
not confine the use of good offices to the transmission of contributions.
" Melander, supra note 46, at 166.
" Sadruddin Aga Khan, supra note 49, at 341; Schnyder, supra note 61, at 443.
"Schnyder, supra note 61, at 443.
"' Although calling for an evaluation of the refugee situation as a whole, the "good offices"
concept obviated the need to investigate the cause of flight on a case-by-case basis. See
Melander, supra note 46, at 167-68. Thus, the "good offices" procedure enabled the
UNHCR to avoid passing judgment on the political conditions in the country of origin.
Schnyder, supra note 61, at 440-41.
" G.A. Res. 2039, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 41, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). In this
resolution, the General Assembly requested "the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees to pursue his efforts with a view to ensuring an adequate international protection
of refugees and to providing satisfactory permanent solutions to the problems affecting the
various groups of refugees within his competence." Id. Subsequent resolutions called upon
the UNHCR to provide international protection and seek permanent solutions on behalf of
refugees "who are his concern." See G.A. Res. 3454, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 92,
U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); G.A. Res. 3271(A), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 90, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A. Res. 2956(A), 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 64, U.N. Doc. A/
8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 2789, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 84, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971);
G.A. Res. 2650, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 74, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res.
2594, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 61, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2399, 23 U.N.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 13:755
UNHCR's good offices was enhanced by the adoption of the OAU
Refugee Convention (OAU Convention) 9 which included good of-
fice refugees within the definition of refugee. 0
Over the past decade, the General Assembly has continued to
expand the authority of the UNHCR with respect to large groups
of persons in situations analogous to that of refugees. 71 Numerous
resolutions have authorized the UNHCR to provide assistance to
displaced persons.72 In these resolutions, the term "displaced per-
sons" has been used to cover both persons displaced within their
own country and persons forced to cross national borders.7 In the
GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2294, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 38, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); G.A. Res. 2197, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at
48, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). The cumulative effect of these resolutions was to abandon the
distinction between good office refugees and refugees falling within the terms of the
UNHCR Statute insofar as the activities of the UNHCR were concerned. See Sadruddin
Aga Khan, supra note 49, at 341-42. But see G.A. Res. 3143, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30)
at 84, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973)(separate mention of good office refugees and refugees under
the UNHCR's mandate).
69 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, done
Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 1288 (1969)[hereinafter cited as
OAU Convention].
70 For the text of this definition, see infra note 84.
71 See generally Sadruddin Aga Khan, supra note 49, at 342-43.
71 In 1972, the General Assembly mentioned refugees and displaced persons in the same
resolution for the first time in commending the UNHCR for its role in the repatriation of
Sudanese who had fled to neighboring countries and who had been displaced within their
own country. G.A. Res. 2958, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 65, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
Since this resolution referred to a specific group of refugees, it did not extend the UNHCR's
jurisdiction to all displaced persons. Sadruddin Aga Khan, supra note 49, at 342. In 1975,
the General Assembly reaffirmed "the eminently humanitarian character of the activities of
the High Commissioner for the benefit of refugees and displaced persons." G.A. Res. 3454,
30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 92, U.N.,Doc. A/10034 (1975). Omitting reference to any
specific group, this resolution implied that the UNHCR could act on behalf of large groups
of people who may not all conform to the conventional definition of a refugee, but are in a
situation analogous to that of refugees. Sadruddin Aga Khan, supra note 49, at 342. The
repeated reference to displaced persons in subsequent resolutions supports this view. See
G.A. Res. 35/187, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 203, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980)(refugees
and displaced children); G.A. Res. 35/135, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 189, U.N. Doc.
A/35/48 (1980)(refugees and displaced women); G.A. Res. 35/41, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
48) at 180, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980)(refugees and displaced persons); G.A. Res. 34/60, 34
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 173, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979)(same); G.A. Res. 33/26, 33
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 139, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978)(same); G.A. Res. 32/69, 32
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 140, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977)(same); G.A. Res. 32/67, 32
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 139, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977)(same); G.A. Res. 31/35, 31
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 94, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976)(same).
" Compare G.A. Res. 3455, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 93, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975)(humanitarian assistance to Indo-Chinese displaced persons, many of whom had
crossed national borders) with G.A. Res. 35/41(A), 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 180,
U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980)(reference to returnees and displaced persons in Zimbabwe). See
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case of the former group, these resolutions mark an expansion of
the UNHCR's competence while, in the case of the latter group,
these resolutions reaffirm the authority of the UNHCR already
recognized under the "good offices" concept.74 The General Assem-
bly has recently endorsed the recommendations of the 1979 Arusha
Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa, with the result
that, in Africa, the competence of the UNHCR now formally ex-
tends to persons falling within the broader definition of the OAU
Convention, that is, to those in refugee-like situations who have
been displaced outside their country of origin.75
Recently, the UNHCR has devoted increasing attention to the
formulation of principles which respond to the problems posed by
the mass movement of asylum-seekers. 76 In October 1981, the Ex-
ecutive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (Exec-
utive Committee) adopted a series of conclusions concerning the
protection of asylum-seekers in situations of large-scale influx.77 In
also supra note 6.
" See U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/593 (1981).
75 G.A. Res. 34/61, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 174, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979). The
1979 Arusha Conference recommended that the "1969 OAU Refugee Convention, the re-
gional complement in Africa of the [1951 Convention], be applied by the United Nations
and all its organs as well as by Non-governmental organizations in dealing with refugee
problems in Africa." Recommendation 7, para. 5, reprinted in AN ANALYZING ACCOUNT OF
THE CONFERENCE ON THE AFRICAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, ARUSHA, MAY 1979 (L. Eriksson, G.
Melander & P. Nobel eds. 1981)[hereinafter cited as AN ANALYZING ACCOUNT].
" At its 31st session in 1980, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Pro-
gramme (Executive Committee) "[d]ecided to request the High Commissioner to convene as
soon as possible a representative group of.experts to examine temporary refuge in all its
aspects within the framework of the problems raised by large-scale influx and to provide the
group with all possible solutions." Temporary Refuge, Conclusion 4, 31 Executive Commit-
tee, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12A) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/35/12/Add.1 (1980). The Executive
Committee "[r]ecognized the need to define the nature, function and implications of the
grant of temporary refuge," id. at 17, para. h, and "[c]onsidered that the practice of tempo-
rary refuge had not been sufficiently examined and should be further studied, particularly in
regard to (i) procedures for the admission of refugees, (ii) their status pending a durable
solution, (iii) the implications of temporary refuge for international solidarity, including
burden sharing." Id. at 17, para. g.
At the UNHCR's request, a group of government officials and legal scholars met in April
1981 to examine the concept of temporary refuge within the framework of problems raised
by the large-scale influx of asylum-seekers. For a summary of this meeting, see Executive
Committee, Sub-Committee of the Whole on International Protection, Report on the Meet-
ing of the Expert Group on Temporary Refuge in Situations of Large-Scale Influx, U.N.
Doc. EC/SCP/16 and Add.1 (1981). The conclusions of this group were adopted by the Ex-
ecutive Committee at its 32nd session. See infra note 77. For a review of these activities as
well as other recent developments concerning the large-scale influx of asylum-seekers, see
generally Martin, supra note 57.
"' Executive Committee, Report on the Thirty-Second Session of the Executive Commit-
tee of the High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/601, at para. 57
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the context of these conclusions, asylum-seekers include refugees
within the meaning of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
and persons who, "owing to external aggression, occupation, for-
eign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in ei-
ther part of [sic) the whole of their country of origin or nationality
are compelled to seek refuge outside that country. 78 Drawing
upon the principle of non-refoulement,79 the Executive Committee
recommended that asylum-seekers be admitted to the state in
which they seek refuge, even if such admission is on a temporary
basis pending arrangements for a durable solution. 80 The Executive
Committee also enumerated a set of minimum standards concern-
ing the treatment and protection to be accorded asylum-seekers in
the country of refuge. 81 Finally, the importance of international
solidarity and burden-sharing was stressed with regard to the at-
tainment of permanent solutions such as voluntary repatriation,
settlement in the receiving country, and resettlement in third
countries s.8  Although non-binding, these conclusions are significant
because they represent the first time that the UNHCR has prof-
fered detailed guidelines for dealing with a mass influx of asylum-
seekers. In effect, the Executive Committee has recommended that
(1981)[hereinafter cited as Report of the Executive Committee]. These conclusions are the
same as those adopted by the group of experts, see supra note 76, except for two changes: 1)
the passages relating to international cooperation and burden-sharing were strengthened
and 2) the potent term "asylum" was deleted in favor of the notion of "admission." See
Martin, supra note 57, at 607.
'8 Report of the Executive Committee, supra note 77, para. 57(2)(I)(1). For the definition
of the term "refugee" under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, see supra text
accompanying note 45. The description of the second category of asylum-seekers is identical
to the broad definition of refugee adopted in the OAU Convention. See infra note 84.
'9 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
1o Report of the Executive Committee, supra note 77, para. 57(2)(II)(A). By requiring
states to admit asylum-seekers temporarily, the conclusions of the Executive Committee go
beyond the principle of non-refoulement which only applies to refugees already within a
state's territory. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. General acceptance of this
broadened conception of non-refoulement by states does not appear to be imminent. See
supra note 40.
" Report of the Executive Committee, supra note 77, para. 57(2)(II)(B). Some of these
standards are drawn from the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol: protection against
discrimination based on race, religion, political opinion, nationality, country of origin, or
physical incapacity. Other standards are derived from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 33: respect for family unity; protection against cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment; and asylum-seekers should receive the basic necessities of life. Finally,
some guidelines are drawn from humane practices in refugee camps: the sending and receiv-
ing of mail should be permitted, and efforts should be made to record births, deaths, and
marriages. See Martin, supra note 57, at 606-07.
" Report of the Executive Committee, supra note 77, para. 57(2)(IV).
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all asylum-seekers temporarily be entitled to the treatment and
protection normally reserved for those who are able to establish
refugee status.
2. Organization of African Unity
The frequency of internal strife within certain African countries
is reflected in a body of regional refugee law particularly respon-
sive to the plight of displaced persons. The OAU Convention 3 de-
fines "refugee" in terms of the realities of the African refugee situ-
ation by including those persons compelled to flee across national
borders to escape violence within their country.84 This extension of
the definition of *refugee beyond the terms of the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol acknowledges that those escaping war or in-
ternal conflict are not necessarily fearful of persecution, but may
simply be unintended victims of violence. 5 Individualized screen-
ing of persons seeking refugee status to establish a subjective fear
of targeted persecution is not required under the OAU Convention;
instead, this definition contemplates a group determination of ref-
83 OAU Convention, supra note 69.
" Id. art. I, para. 2. Article I(1) of the OAU Convention essentially repeats the definition
of refugee contained in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Article 1(2) extends the
definition to include displaced persons:
[tihe term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external ag-
gression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public or-
der in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled
to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place
outside his country of origin or nationality.
1 L. HOLBORN, supra note 61, at 189. The 1951 Convention's definition of refugee, even
after the adoption of the 1967 Protocol, was too narrow to encompass the general African
refugee situation. Wairobi, Rights and Obligations of Refugees, in AN ANALYZING AccouNr,
supra note 75, at 102, 107. Over 90% of the refugees in Africa have crossed borders in large
numbers; these are primarily rural people who seek safety from dangerous conditions pre-
vailing in their own countries. Id. at 103. The OAU definition covers persons displaced by
wars of national liberation, internal conflicts in independent countries, and persons from
countries under foreign domination. Id. at 108. The OAU definition also covers persons flee-
ing violent conditions which only prevail in part of the country of origin.
It has been noted that the different definitions of the term "refugee" may result in the
"emergence in Africa of different classes of refugees-those who qualify for assistance under
all the international instruments, and those who only qualify under one-with a consequent
confusion and disagreement among states and international agencies regarding to whom to
accord which standard of treatment." 1 L. HOLBORN, supra note 61, at 190. For example, the
statistical information employed by various relief organizations in determining which per-
sons are entitled to assistance may vary significantly because of different definitions of "ref-
ugee." Nobel, Refugees, Law, and Development in Africa, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES, MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 255, 262-65 (1982). Relief programs
have been stalemated because of ignorance or arguments over the number of refugees. Id. at
262.
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ugee status based on objective criteria: violent conditions which
threaten entire populations.8 6 Article II of the OAU Convention
improves the legal status of persons seeking asylum,"7 especially
when read in conjunction with the broad definition of refugee. The
cornerstone of this article is a non-refoulement provision which
goes beyond the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol by prohib-
iting both rejection at the border of refugees coming directly from
a country where they are endangered and expulsion or return of
refugees to states where they may be subject to persecution. 8 A
corollary to this progressive formulation of the non-refoulement
principle is the notion of burden-sharing. 89 States geographically
removed from countries where violations of human rights occur or
81 Nobel, supra note 85, at 262. The mass refugee movements prevalent in Africa make it
difficult to apply the subjective test requiring individual screening called for by the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Weis, The Convention of the Organization of African
Unity Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 3 HuM. RTS. J. 449,
455 (1970). In particular, developing countries encounter difficulties in implementing the
administrative machinery necessary for such individual determination proceedings. Nobel,
supra note 85, at 258.
87 OAU Convention, supra note 69, art. II. This article has been characterized as "[tihe
most important innovative feature" in the instrument as it represents the first time that an
individual's right to asylum in certain circumstances has been recognized in a binding inter-
national instrument. 1 L. HOLBORN, supra note 61, at 192.
The basic principle of asylum is set forth in article 11(1): "Member States of the OAU
shall use their best endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to receive refu-
gees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who, for well-founded reasons, are una-
ble or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality." It has been observed
that this provision is "recommendatory rather than mandatory" and "the fact that the re-
ception of refugees is made subject to national legislation may constitute a serious limita-
tion." Weis, supra note 86, at 457. However, read as a whole, article II enhances the position
of asylum-seekers, Wairobi, supra note 85, at 108, as it urges states to enact national legisla-
tion which, at a minimum, reflects the provisions of the OAU Convention. I. DIALLO, LES
RAFUGI S EN AFRIQUE 124 (1974). For a brief survey of legislation enacted in various African
countries, see Nobel, supra note 85, at 267-70.
OAU Convention, supra note 69, art. II, para. 3. This non-refoulement provision states:
No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection
at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or re-
main in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened
for the reasons set out in Article I, paragraphs 1 and 2.
This principle of non-refoulement is not synonymous with that of territorial asylum: "for
the refugee it means safety in that he may not be forced to remain in or returned to the
country where he fears persecution; but he may find himself parcelled away to some third
State." S. AIBONI, PROTECTION OF REFUGEES IN AFRICA 71 (1978).
89 OAU Convention, supra note 69, art. II, para. 4. The Conference on the Situation of
Refugees in Africa, held in Arusha, Tanzania in May 1979, adopted a recommendation
which called upon the OAU to strengthen and develop institutional arrangements for bur-
den-sharing and to undertake studies on the problems related to burden-sharing. Recom-
mendation 1, paras. 8-9, reprinted in AN ANALYZING ACCOUNT, supra note 75, at 47-48.
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where civil disturbance is prevalent are urged to admit refugees,
alleviating the burden placed on countries of first asylum. 0 OAU
members are also called upon to grant temporary asylum pending
arrangements for resettlement in a country able to grant perma-
nent asylum.91 Finally, the purely humanitarian character of the
grant of asylum is underscored."2
III. UNITED STATES REFUGEE LAW
A. Historical Background
Prior to the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, United States
refugee programs were conducted on an ad hoc basis.9 Effective
response to refugee crises was hampered by immigration laws
which restricted the number of refugees eligible for admission into
the United States by means of a national origins quota system94
90 OAU Convention, supra note 69, art. II, para. 4.
91 Id. para. 5. Although this provision states that a refugee "may" be granted temporary
asylum, the non-refoulement principle dictates that the refugee must be temporarily admit-
ted if, in the case of non-admission, he would be compelled to return to, or remain in, a
country where he might be persecuted. Weis, supra note 86, at 458.
92 Article 11(2) of the OAU Convention states: "[tihe.grant of asylum to refugees is a
peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any Mem-
ber States." The desire to depoliticize the refugee problem was a primary concern of the
drafters. Refugees had been a source of political tension among African states as govern-
ments of the countries of origin often viewed the grant of asylum to their fleeing nationals
by neighboring states as an unfriendly act. Governments faced with a mass influx of refu-
gees were reluctant to grant asylum as it might antagonize neighboring states since the po-
litically conscious among the nationals might use the country of asylum as a base from
which to conduct operations against the country of origin. The OAU Convention's emphasis
upon the purely humanitarian character of the problem rendered it more amenable to solu-
tion. 1 L. HOLBORN, supra note 61, at 183-84.
The desire to diffuse tension among OAU states attributable to the refugee problems is
also expressed in article 111(2) of the OAU Convention: "Signatory States undertake to pro-
hibit refugees residing in their respective territories from attacking any State Member of
the OAU, by any activity likely to cause tension between Member States, and in particular
by use of arms, through the press, or by radio." Similarly, article 11(6) instructs countries of
asylum to "settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of
origin."
" For an historical overview of United States refugee law, see generally U.S. IMMIGRATION
LAW AND POLICY, supra note 2; Schmidt, Development of United States Refugee Policy, 28
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE REP. 1 (1979); 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IM-
MIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.24Aa(1)-(2) (rev. ed. 1983).
" Until the end of World War II, basic principles of United States immigration law were
contained in the Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874, and in the
Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153. The 1924 Act limited the total
number of immigrants that could be admitted into the United States and attempted to
maintain proportions of different races and nationals in the population through the use of
numerical restrictions based on a national origins formula. The national origins quota sys-
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and, later, by a statutory scheme burdened with ideological and
geographical limitations.90 To circumvent these restrictions, it be-
came necessary to use ad hoc measures to deal with refugee crises.
Thus, special legislative enactments of limited duration were nec-
essary during the period after World War II to admit over 600,000
refugees into the United States. 6 Other groups of refugees were
admitted under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and National-
ity Act of 1952 (INA)9 7 which authorized the Attorney General to
parole aliens into the United States for emergency reasons or for
reasons in the public interest.98 The parole authority was a flexible
device which enabled the United States to aid numerous categories
of persons in need of assistance.99 Those individuals who were
tern was repealed by the 1965 legislation. See infra note 95.
95 The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. 911 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.), was the first permanent refugee
legislation. It repealed the national origins system and substituted a scheme of priorities
based on reunification of families and job skills. The 1965 amendments also provided for the
conditional entry of refugees who were defined as aliens fleeing persecution in a communist
country or a country in the Middle East. After two years in the United States, these persons
could adjust their status to become lawful permanent residents. The geographical and ideo-
logical restrictions placed on the definition of a refugee prevented any substantial improve-
ment in the refugee admissions policy, resulting in the continued use of ad hoc measures
such as the Attorney General's parole power. In the late 1970's, Congress enacted legislation
aimed at abolishing the geographical restrictions of the 1965 amendments, creating a single,
worldwide system which eliminated distinctions based upon an individual's place of birth.
See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907
(1978); Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat.
2703.
The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, amended by Act
of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219, and Act of June 28, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-
60, 65 Stat. 96, and the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400,
amended by Act of Aug. 31, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-751, 68 Stat. 1044, authorized the admis-
sion of over 600,000 refugees between 1948 and 1957. The Displaced Persons Act charged
the refugees against existing immigration quotas, mortgaging many of these quotas into the
future. The mortgaging of future quotas was cancelled in 1957. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub.
L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639. The Refugee Relief Act admitted refugees outside of the quota
system. Both of these acts were considered as emergency relief measures, and Congress ex-
pressly disavowed any intent to create a precedent or commitment. See, e.g., CONF. REP.,
83d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 2122-23.
07 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1157 (1976 and Supp. V 1981)).
98 For a discussion of the parole authority, see generally 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
supra note 93, § 2.54; Note, Refugees Under United States Immigration Law, 24 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 528, 531-39 (1975); Comment, Refugee-Parolee: The Dilemma of the Indochina Ref-
ugee, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 175 (1975).
" The first large-scale use of the parole authority occurred in 1956 when 32,000 Hun-
garian refugees fleeing from the Soviet invasion were admitted. From 1960 to 1965, the pa-
role authority was used to admit approximately 20,000 refugees from the Middle East and
communist countries. See generally S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (enumera-
774
1983] DEAN RUSK AWARD 775
brought into the country under the parole authority were not given
lawful permanent resident status, but simply temporary refuge. 00
In the 1970's, the parole authority was frequently invoked to admit
large numbers of Cubans, Indochinese, and other groups not eligi-
ble for admission under United States immigration laws. 10 1
B. Current Status
The Refugee Act of 1980 transformed a confused configuration
of domestic refugee law into a more coherent statutory scheme. 10 2
The purpose of the new legislation was to establish permanent and
systematic procedures for the admission of refugees and a compre-
hensive framework for providing assistance to those refugees who
are admitted.103 An expanded definition of refugee was adopted 0 4
as well as a mandatory non-refoulement provision105 in an effort to
conform United States law to the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol. An annual admission ceiling for refugees was imposed,106
and the admissions procedure was revised.10 7 New resettlement
programs were also introduced. 08
Under the Refugee Act, the term "refugee" refers to an alien ap-
plying for admission to the United States from another country. 0 9
An alien who is already inside the United States or who is applying
for admission at the border is dealt with separately under the asy-
tion of all cases in which the parole authority has been used).
100 Aliens admitted into the United States under the parole authority were often allowed
to adjust their status to lawful permanent resident aliens through the enactment of special
legislation. See, e.g., Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419 (Hungarians); Act
of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (Cubans); Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L.
No.'95-145, 91 Stat. 1223 (Indochinese).
103 Schmidt, supra note 93, at 1-2.
l01 For a thorough examination of the legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980, see
Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980,
19 SAN DIGO L. REv. 9 (1981). For concise analytical treatments of the legislation, see Mar-
tin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
REFUGEES, MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91 (1982); Recent Development, Immigration Law:
Treatment of Refugees, 21 HARv. INr'L L.J. 742 (1980).
108 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (Supp. V 1981).
104 For the text of this definition, see supra note 8.
,08 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. V 1981).
'o" 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981). This section sets an annual ceiling of 50,000 for
refugee admissions in fiscal years 1980-82; after 1982, the President will set the ceiling after
appropriate consultation with Congress. Id.
'07 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b)-(e) (Supp. V 1981).
108 Id. § 1521 (Supp. V 1981). This provision established the Office of Refugee Resettle-
ment within the Department of Health and Human Services to administer and implement
resettlement programs for refugees. Id.
30 See supra note 8 (definition of refugee).
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lum provisions of the new legislation.1 Both refugees and asylum-
seekers must meet the same criteria in order to receive sanctuary
in the United States,111 but the distinction between the two groups
is more than mere statutory semantics since each group must fol-
low a different procedure in order to gain admission to the United
States. 112 In the following sections, United States refugee law will
be examined in order to determine the extent to which relief is
extended to displaced persons. Displaced persons seeking admis-
sion to the United States from another country and those already
inside the United States or seeking admission at the border will be
treated separately in order to avoid confusion between the refugee
admissions procedure and the asylum process.
1. Admission of Refugees and Parole
The Refugee Act limits the annual "normal flow" of refugees
into the United States to 50,000 through fiscal year 1982, with later
ceilings to be set by the President in consultation with Congress. "
Additional refugees "of special humanitarian concern" to the
United States may be admitted by the President after appropriate
consultation with Congress. " 4 In emergency situations, the Presi-
dent has the authority to admit refugees above the annual ceiling
without consulting Congress for a period not to exceed one year." 5
Refugees who have been physically present in the United States
for one year may adjust their status to lawful permanent
residence. " 6
To be eligible for admission, an alien must fall within the scope
110 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. V 1981). In the interest of clarity, these aliens will be
referred to as asylum-seekers.
"' See id. ("the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if
the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee").
"' For a discussion of the refugee admissions procedure, see infra notes 113-15 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the asylum process, see infra notes 153-67 and accom-
panying text.
'3 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981). After 1982, the number of annual admissions
will be determined by the President after appropriate consultation with Congress. Id. §
1157(a)(2). For fiscal year 1983, the annual ceiling was set at 90,000, of which 64,000 were
allocated to East Asia; 15,000 to the Soviet Union/Eastern Europe; 6,000 to the Near East/
South Asia; 3,000 to Africa; 2,000 to Latin America/Carribean; and an additional 5,000 for
adjustment to permanent residence of aliens who have been granted asylum. Presidential
Determination No. 83-2, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,483 (1982).
4 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(1)-(2), (d), (e) (Supp. V 1981).
"A Id. § 1157(b).
" Id. § 1159.
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of the statutory definition of refugee.1 7 The Refugee Act signifi-
cantly broadened the definition by removing previous ideological
and geographical restrictions " in order to conform to the language
of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol." 9 Under the new
definition, an alien must establish "a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion."1 0 The revised definition
also allows aliens who are still within their country to acquire refu-
gee status if they are persecuted or have a well-founded fear of
persecution and are specifically designated by the President after
appropriate consultation with Congress. '21 Although the Refugee
Act's definition is broader than the previous definition, it does not
include displaced persons. Displaced persons are fleeing from wide-
spread conditions of civil violence and are not part of a group that
is singled out for persecution for any of the reasons enumerated in
the statute. 2
Although ineligible for admission to the United States under the
new refugee admission programs, displaced persons may be able to
gain temporary admission under the Attorney General's parole au-
thority. As noted above, the parole power is a discretionary form of
relief which has been used in the past to admit large groups of
aliens.' The Refugee Act narrows the scope of this power: the At-
torney General may not parole an alien who is a refugee into the
United States unless there are compelling reasons in the public in-
terest which would require that the alien be paroled rather than
admitted as a refugee.1 2' By requiring an individual determination
of eligibility for parole in cases involving aliens who qualify as ref-
ugees, Congress sought to prevent the use of the parole power as a
means of circumventing the refugee admissions procedure estab-
117 Id. § 1101(a)(42) (Supp. V 1981). For the text of this definition, see supra note 8.
I" Under the-previous definition, only persons who came from communist-dominated or
Middle Eastern countries could be refugees. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976)(amended 1980);
see also supra note 95.
"' See H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980)(Refugee Act incorporates defini-
tion contained in 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol); S. REP. No. 256, supra note 99, at 4
(new definition intended to bring United States law into conformity with international
treaty obligations under 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
,' Id. § 1101(a)(42)(B).
,' See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
", 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
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lished by the Refugee Act.125 Congress made it clear, however, that
this restriction does not apply to groups of aliens who are not refu-
gees. 126 Since displaced persons are ineligible for refugee status,
they would appear to be unaffected by the limitation imposed on
the use of the parole power by the Refugee Act and, therefore, eli-
gible for temporary refuge in the United States under the parole
power.
The wide flexibility associated with the parole authority, which
allows an alien to receive temporary refuge in the United States for
a variety of reasons, 127 engenders several problems. First, the deci-
sion of whether to invoke the parole authority is discretionary and
may be unduly influenced by political considerations. 28 In the
past, the Attorney General's exercise of discretion favored aliens
fleeing communist-dominated countries, 29 which has prompted al-
legations that the use of the parole authority is based upon politi-
cal rather than humanitarian considerations. 3 Second, aliens who
have been paroled into the United States do not have any legal
residence status and are considered not to have entered the United
States for the purposes of the immigration laws.' 3' When the pa-
role is terminated, the parolee acquires the status of an alien seek-
ing admission to the United States at the border and, conse-
quently, his admissibility is determined in exclusion pro-
ceedings.' 32
2. Asylum and Withholding of Deportation
The Refugee Act established a statutory basis for asylum for the
first time in the history of United States refugee law. 33 Under the
125 REVIEW OF REFUGEE PROGRAMS, supra note 2, at 42; see also S. REP. No. 256, supra
note 99, at 1.
"I H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 160, 162 (recognizing that the new limitation imposed on the parole power
"does not affect the Attorney General's authority under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act to parole aliens who are not deemed to be refugees").
" See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 93, § 2.54, at 2-369.
128 See Hanson, supra note 9, at 127-28.
129 See S. REP. No. 256, supra note 99 (enumeration of cases in which the parole author-
ity has been used).
130 See Hanson, supra note 9, at 127-28.
1' 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1976 and Supp. V 1981); see also 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSEN-
FIELD, supra note 93, § 2.54, at 2-368, -373 to -374.
132 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1976 and Supp. V 1981); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d) (1983).
33 Prior to 1980, asylum-seekers had been allowed to remain in the United States under a
variety of programs, including parole granted by the Attorney General, conditional entry,
and regulatory asylum procedures established by the INS. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSEN-
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terms of the new legislation, asylum is a discretionary form of re-
lief available to aliens already inside the United States or seeking
entry at a land border or port of entry.'3 ' An alien may apply for
asylum, even if he is within the United States illegally, tempora-
rily, or on parole. 3 5 To be eligible for asylum, the alien must fall
within the scope of the statutory definition of refugee.'3 6 Asylum is
granted in one-year increments, and renewal depends upon pre-
vailing political conditions within the asylee's home country.137
Aliens granted asylum may apply for adjustment of status to be-
come lawful permanent residents one year subsequent to the grant
of asylum; 38 only 5,000 aliens who have been granted asylum may
adjust their status each year." 9
A form of relief closely related to the grant of asylum is the
withholding of deportation." 0  The Refugee Act declares that
"It]he Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien. . . to
a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life
or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.""' Prior to 1980, the decision whether to with-
hold deportation was left to the discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral," 2 and, consequently, courts were frequently faced with the
FIELD, supra note 93, § 2.24A.
s" 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. V 1981).
'36 See id.
"' Id. For the definition of refugee, see supra note 8.
137 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (Supp. V 1981); 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(e), .15 (1983).
8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (Supp. V 1981).
139 Id.
140 See Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1022, 1029 (5th Cir. 1982)(withholding
of deportation is "functional equivalent" of asylum). In Matter of Lam, Interim Dec. No.
2857 (Board Immigration App. March 24, 1982), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
noted two differences between the two forms of relief. First, an alien granted asylum may,
after one year, apply for adjustment of status, but an alien who has been granted withhold-
ing of deportation has no such means of becoming a permanent resident. Id. at 6-7. Second,
the concept of firm resettlement is not relevant to applications for withholding of deporta-
tion as a grant of that relief bars deportation to only a single country, while firm resettle-
ment is crucial to asylum applications because asylum in the United States will not be
granted if an alien has been firmly resettled in a third country. Id. at 6. See also Matter of
McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 544 (1980) (emphasizing that asylum is discretionary while
withholding of deportation is mandatory under the terms of the Refugee Act).
.4. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. V 1981). The Refugee Act also provides that four categories
of aliens may not be granted the relief of withholding of deportation: 1)an alien involved in
persecution; 2)an alien convicted of a serious crime constituting a danger to the community,
3)an alien who has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside of the United States prior
to arrival; and 4)an alien who presents a danger to the security of the United States. Id.
"" Prior to 1980, section 243(h) of the INA provided that:
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issue of whether the exercise of this discretion was consistent with
the obligations imposed by the non-refoulement provision of the
1967 Protocol.14 s The Refugee Act purported to resolve this ques-
tion by removing the Attorney General's discretionary power to
withhold deportation in an effort to conform domestic refugee law
to the terms of the 1967 Protocol.14'
The practical significance of this change may be limited because
the Attorney General retains the discretion to determine whether
conditions in the alien's homeland warrant the withholding of de-
portation. Currently, there is a conflict among the circuits concern-
ing the effect of the mandatory language of the new withholding of
deportation provision on the Attorney General's power to de-
port.143 The Second and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within
the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be sub-
ject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion and for such
period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214,
amended by Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(F), 79 Stat. 918 (1965).
143 Prior to the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, United States courts consistently
refused to interfere with the Attorney General's judgment on the question of whether to
withhold deportation. See, e.g., Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. de-
nied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961). After the accession of the United States to the 1967 Protocol, the
Fifth Circuit evidenced a willingness to review the INS findings of fact regarding conditions
in the alien's homeland, see Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977), suggesting that
the courts had altered their prior posture toward judicial review of INS findings. See Note,
Immigration Law-Persecution Claims-The Expanding Scope of Section 243(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 13 TEx. INT'L L.J. 327 (1978). However, the Fifth Circuit
declined to decide whether the 1967 Protocol restricts the Attorney General's discretion to
refuse to withhold deportation. See Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d at 996-97. Another Fifth Cir-
cuit case found that the 1967 Protocol had no effect on the administration of United States
immigration laws. See Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied,
551 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 570 F.2d
95 (5th Cir. 1978). In light of these cases, one author has concluded that the 1967 Protocol
had little effect on United States immigration law. See Frank, Effect of the 1967 United
Nations Protocol on the Status of Refugees in the United States, 11 INT'L LAW. 291 (1977).
144 H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 160, 161 (new withholding of deportation provision "is based directly
upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consis-
tent with the Protocol"). But cf. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 99, at 9 (assuming that new
withholding of deportation provision does not change the standard to be used in deciding
whether to withhold deportation); H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979) (stat-
ing that language of 1967 Protocol adopted "for the sake of clarity" in belief that the new
withholding of deportation provision would not affect the substantive law).
145 See generally Comment, Non-Refoulement of Refugees: United States Compliance
with International Obligations, 23 HAnv. INT'L L.J. 357, 371-77 (1983); Note, Those Who
Stand at the Door: Assessing Immigration Claims Based on Fear of Persecution, 18 NEw
ENG. L. REv. 395, 408-20 (1983); Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the
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that an alien need not establish a "clear probability" of persecu-
tion in his country in order to prevent deportation as required
under previous case law' 14" The Third Circuit, however, has main-
tained that the passage of the Refugee Act had no effect on the
alien's evidentiary burden.147 In a related decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that courts must apply the "substantial evidence" test
instead of the more lenient "abuse-of-discretion" standard when
reviewing the fact findings of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) as to the likelihood of persecution.'48
If the new mandatory withholding of deportation provision is in-
terpreted as lessening the alien's evidentiary burden as well as
heightening the standard of judicial review, most asylum-seekers
would benefit. For instance, an alien unable to produce evidence
which specifically identifies him as a likely victim of persecution if
returned to his country may still be able to avoid deportation. 49
Rights of Aliens, 96 HASv. L. REv. 1286, 1352-58 (1983).
,4' Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1982); Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 103 U.S. 1'249 (1983). Neither the Stevic court nor the Reyes court suggested
an alternative standard. Rather, both courts simply noted that deportation must be with-
held upon a showing "far short of a clear probability." Reyes, 693 F.2d at 599 (quoting
Stevic, 678 F.2d at 409). In Stevic, the court stated that:
It would be unwise to attempt a more detailed elaboration of the applicable legal
test under the Protocol. It emphasizes the fear of the applicant as well as the
reasonableness of that fear. Its further development must await concrete factual
situations as they arise. That development can be informed by the traditional in-
dices of legislative intent, by the Handbook, and by experience.
Stevic, 678 F.2d at 409. The Handbook referred to is the UNHCR's HANDBOOK ON
PRODEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979). The court in Stevic
observed that "[slince the Handbook was specifically designed to aid governments in inter-
preting the Protocol... and has been subsequently relied upon by the BIA in interpreting
the revised [withholding of deportation provision] . .. we accord its view considerable
weight." Stevic, 678 F.2d at 409.
147 Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699
F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983). The court in Rejaie asserted that Stevic had misinterpreted the
legislative history of the Refugee Act. Rejaie, 691 F.2d at 146. According to the Rejaie court,
Congress did not intend to alter prior case law which held that the "clear probability" stan-
dard and the standard required under the 1967 Protocol were equivalent. Id.
148 McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981); accord Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597
(6th Cir. 1982). Prior to McMullen, the alien was required to show an administrative abuse
of discretion in order to convince a court -to withhold deportation. See, e.g., Kasravi v. INS,
400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968). To avoid deportation under the new standard, the alien must
show a likelihood of persecution if repatriated, and the Attorney General is required to
produce substantial evidence to the contrary. The court in McMullen reasoned that this
more stringent standard was appropriate in light of the mandatory language of the new
withholding of deportation provision. McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1316. This same rationale was
used by the Second and Sixth Circuits in relaxing the alien's burden of proof. See supra
note 146.
140 See Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1982). Under the "clear probability" test, the
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The more lenient evidentiary burden which the alien is required to
meet in a deportation proceeding allows a grant of withholding of
deportation on the basis of both general reports concerning condi-
tions in the alien's homeland as well as letters and affidavits from
himself, friends, and relatives. 150 The situation of displaced per-
sons, however, will not be affected by these developments. Dis-
placed persons may be able to produce reliable evidence docu-
menting a widespread civil war in their country, but, as innocent
neutrals, their life or freedom is not threatened for any of the rea-
sons set forth in the statute. 1 ' Thus, displaced persons are ineligi-
ble for asylum or withholding of deportation because the civil up-
heaval in their homeland threatens the entire population rather
than only a distinct segment. 152
Although displaced persons are ineligible for a grant of asylum
or withholding of deportation under the substantive provisions of
the Refugee Act, they may obtain temporary protection in the
United States by taking advantage of the lengthy procedure in-
volved in adjudicating asylum claims.5' An alien may raise a claim
for asylum before a district director of the INS'" and again before
alien was generally required to show that he was targeted for persecution. See, e.g., Cheng
Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968). It has
been observed that this "requirement of objective evidence documenting persecution specifi-
cally of applicants erects a virtually insuperable barrier to attainment of refugee status."
Developments in the Law, supra note 145, at 1355.
110 See Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1982).
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
1 See Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1982). In Martinez-Romero, the
court rejected the plaintiff's request to withhold deportation to El Salvador because of the
civil upheaval in that country. The court reasoned:
If we were to agree with the petitioners that no person should be returned to El
Salvador because of the reported anarchy present there now, it would permit the
whole population, if they could enter this country some way, to stay here indefi-
nitely. There must be some special circumstances present before relief can be
granted.
Id. at 595-96. Cf. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("a finding
that notice of the asylum is required in no way amounts to a determination that
Salvadorans should be granted asylum or even that they should receive special considera-
tion because of the civil war in El Salvador").
'5' See S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. 12 (1983). "At the present time aliens not
legally entitled to be in this country are able to stay for months or even years, pursuing
various stages of appeal. Furthermore, during such delay most are able to move freely in
American society, many with work authorization." Id. See also 129 CONG. REc. S6938-39
(daily ed. May 18, 1983) (docket review of a case in which an alien admitted as a visitor in
1974 has only recently reached a federal court of appeals).
-- 8 C.F.R. § 208.1, .3(a) (1983). If an alien is seeking admission to the United States, the
application for asylum is filed with the district director of the port of entry. Id. If the alien
is already within the United States, the application is filed with the district director having
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an immigration judge in an exclusion or deportation proceeding. "5
If the district director denies the request for asylum, the decision
may not be appealed, 15s and the alien is placed in exclusion or de-
portation proceedings which are conducted by an immigration
judge.157 In these proceedings, the alien may renew the request for
asylum which is also to be considered a request for withholding of
deportation. In the exclusion or deportation proceeding, the alien
must present the same type of information to the same judge
under the same procedures and, thus, the structure of the asylum
hearing and the withholding of deportation hearing is identical."
The decision of the immigration judge is appealable to the Board
of Immigration Appeals.' 59 After these administrative remedies
have been exhausted, the alien may seek judicial review of the
decision.1 60
Before deciding a claim for asylum brought prior to the initia-
tion of exclusion or deportation proceedings, the INS district di-
rector must solicit an advisory opinion from the State Depart-
ment's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
(BHRHA) 61 In deportation or exclusion proceedings, the immi-
gration judge must also request an advisory opinion.1 62 Although
non-binding, this advisory opinion is accorded considerable weight
in deciding whether to grant asylum or to withhold deportation.""
jurisdiction over the alien's place of residence in the United States. Id.
I' 48 Fed. Reg. 5885 (1983)(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.1). Once exclusion or deporta-
tion proceedings have begun, the immigration judge has exclusive jurisdiction over any ap-
plication for asylum. Id. An exclusion proceeding deals with an alien who has not yet en-
tered the United States and who seeks admittance. 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra
note 93, § 3.18. A deportation proceeding deals with an alien who has entered the United
States, but whose right to remain is questioned. Id.
1" 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(c) (1983).
,57 See supra note 155. If the request for asylum is denied by the district director, the
alien is placed in exclusion proceedings unless the alien elects to withdraw the application
for admission. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(0(3) (1983).
'" Kurzban, Restructuring the Asylum Process, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 91, 110 (1981); see
also Meissner, supra note 5, at 3 ("[i]n practice, this withholding of deportation provision
has proved to be confusing in application, as it parallels the asylum provision, is based on
the same types of claims to persecution, and yet appears to provide a separate claim to
refuge").
in See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.8, 242.21 (1983).
8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(9), (b) (1970).
8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1983).
162 Id. § 208.10(b). The immigration judge is not required to request an advisory opinion
if an opinion was received by the district director in connection with an application for
asylum unless the immigration judge finds that circumstances have materially changed since
the first opinion was issued. Id.
'" See Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. No. 2922, at 4 n.3 (Sept. 29, 1982) (BHRHA
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
It entails an assessment of the prevailing political conditions in the
applicant's home country in order to determine whether the claim
is justified." 4 Although the BHRHA possesses expertise in evaluat-
ing conditions around the world, particularly in the field of human
rights, it is part of an organ primarily concerned with foreign pol-
icy.' 65 On occasion, the applicant's native country may view the
grant of asylum as an unfriendly act. 6 6 The political implications
of the asylum decision may, therefore, lead the BHRHA to evalu-
ate claims on grounds far removed from the humanitarian consid-
erations embodied in the Refugee Act.16 7
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983 (1983 Reform
Act)1 8 sought to revise the existing asylum process. During the
first session of the 98th Congress, the bill was passed by the Senate
but failed to reach the floor of the House for a vote.6 9 Prompted
by recent mass influxes of asylum-seekers, the proposed legislation
would have streamlined the asylum process so that those with
valid claims would be heard in a timely fashion, while those with
frivolous claims would not be able to resort to procedural delaying
tactics. 70 The House and Senate versions of the legislation differed
in several respects, but the general structure of the asylum process
was similar.17 ' The legislation provided for a summary exclusion
proceeding without an appeal for undocumented aliens who are not
claiming asylum.1 7 2 For all asylum cases, the bill provided exten-
sive administrative consideration. 73 Finally, opportunities for judi-
opinion supporting a persecution claim "should be given significant weight, particularly
where supporting evidence and testimony supports such a conclusion").
' See 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 93, § 5.16b, at 5-192 to 5-192.2.
'6 Cf. Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 199-200 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that information sup-
plied by the State Department to the INS does not carry a guarantee of reliability since the
revelation of the political shortcomings of a friendly nation "is not always compatible with
the high duty to maintain advantageous diplomatic relations with nations").
'" Cf. id.
Me See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 482-93 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd
as modified sub nom, Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982)(find-
ing State Department information to be unreliable); see generally Hanson, supra note 9.
1" S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S6970-86 (daily ed. May 18, 1983); H.R.
1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. REP. No. 115, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 1.
169 See supra note 5.
110 H.R. REP. No. 115, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 34-35.
. Compare S. 529, supra note 168, §§ 121-124, 129 CONG. REc. S6973-76 with H.R. 1510,
supra note 168, §§ 121-124, H.R. REP. No. 115, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 8-14. See also 129
CONG. RE C. S6938 (daily ed. May 18, 1983)(statements of Senators Kennedy and Simpson).
... S. 529, supra note 168, § 121, 129 CONG. REc. S6973; H.R. 1510, supra note 168, § 121,
H.R. REP. No. 115, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 8-9.
5" & 529, supra note 168, §§ 122, 124, 129 CONG. REc. S6974-76; H.R. 1510, supra note
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cial review of administrative decisions would have been limited. 7"
Under the summary exclusion provisions of the proposed act, dis-
placed persons would have experienced difficulty in presenting
claims for asylum. 175 In addition, the ability of displaced persons to
use procedural delays in order to remain in the United States
would have been curtailed, particularly by those provisions limit-
ing opportunities for judicial review.
A blanket grant of extended voluntary departure has been the
device most frequently used to allow displaced persons to remain
in the United States pending cessation of hostilities in their home-
land. 176 The district director of the INS is authorized to grant ex-
tended voluntary departure in cases where such action is war-
ranted by compelling factors such as civil war or catastrophic
circumstances. 177 Extended voluntary departure is normally
granted in increments of one year; at the end of this period, the
alien's file is reviewed to determine whether a further grant of ex-
tended voluntary departure is warranted.17 The grant of extended
voluntary departure may be revoked at any time if it is determined
that conditions have improved in the alien's home country.' 79 The
decision to grant extended voluntary departure is based upon rec-
ommendations of the State Department.'"0 Recommendations rest
upon assessments of the conditions prevailing in the alien's home
168, §§ 122, 124, H.R. REP. No. 115, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 9-10, 12-14.
"I S. 529, supra note 168, § 123, 129 CONG. REC. S6974-75; H.R. 1510, supra note 168, §
123, H.R. REP. No. 115, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 10-12.
175 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 1510 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1983)(prepared statement of Rep. Towns) ("[slummary
exclusion proceedings are clearly open to abuse of discretion by INS officials"). Cf. Orantes-
Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 358-63 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (enjoining INS from using
certain tactics to obtain voluntary departure agreements from Salvadorans).
176 Blanket grants of extended voluntary departure have been extended to Ethiopians,
Ugandans, Iranians, Nicaraguans, Lebanese, and Poles. REFUGEE POLICY GROUP, POLITICAL
AsYLuM: A BACKGROUND PAPER ON CoNcEPTS, PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS 28 (Dec. 1982);
Letter from David Crossland, Acting Commissioner of the INS, to Senator Edward M. Ken-
nedy (Apr. 6, 1981), reprinted in 128 CONG. REC. S582 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982)[hereinafter
cited as INS Letter]. In August 1981, the grant of extended voluntary departure to Ethiopi-
ans was withdrawn as conditions were considered to have significantly changed. For a dis-
cussion of the controversy surrounding this decision, see Deutsch, The Ethiopian Contro-
versy, AFRICA REP. 49 (May-June 1982). In July 1982, the grant of extended voluntary
departure status to Ethiopians was extended for one year. REFUGEE POLICY GROUP, supra, at
29.
.7 8 C.F.R. § 242.5 (1983); INS Operating Instructions § 242.10e(3) (1979).
170 INS Operating Instructions § 242.10e(3) (1979).
179 Id.
ISO See INS Letter, supra note 176, at S831.
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country.181 Recently, it has been alleged that these assessments
lack objectivity and are dominated by foreign policy, rather than
humanitarian concerns, resulting in a discriminatory use of ex-
tended voluntary departure.182
In comparison with asylum and withholding of deportation, ex-
tended voluntary departure is a flexible device which permits hu-
manitarian responses to refugee crises.'83 In particular, extended
voluntary departure allows the United States to extend protection
to displaced persons while avoiding the political implications of
asylum or withholding of deportation. 11 4 However, the flexibility of
extended voluntary departure carries a concomitant loss of bene-
fits. 85 Aliens granted extended voluntary departure simply receive
181 Id.
'" See N.Y. Times, May 31, 1983, at A20, col. 1 (criticizing United States Government
policy of granting extended voluntary departure to Poles but not to Salvadorans despite
widespread violence in El Salvador); Hearings on Mass Asylum, supra note 8, at 28-29
(statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy)(questioning failure of INS to find that conditions
in El Salvador warranted the grant of extended voluntary departure in light of statistics
which showed that some 17,000 civilians are killed each year, 150,000 Salvadorans are inter-
nally displaced, 200,000 Salvadorans are outside their country); see also UNHCR Memoran-
dum, supra note 9; AMERICAN COUNCI. OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES FOR FOREIGN SERVICE,
STATEMENT ON SAFE HAVEN FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES, reprinted in 129 CONG. REC.
S8643-44 (daily ed. June 16, 1983)(urging United States Government to adopt a safe haven
policy toward Central American refugees, particularly those from El Salvador and
Guatemala).
In January 1983, a resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives which
expressed:
the sense of the House that the Secretary of State should recommend to the At-
torney General that extended voluntary departure status should be granted to
aliens who are nationals of El Salvador and that the Attorney General should ex-
ercise his discretion and grant such status to such aliens until the situation in El
Salvador has changed sufficiently to permit their safely residing in that country.
H.R. Res. 21, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. E5 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1983). In introduc-
ing this resolution, Representative Weiss emphasized that the resolution simply calls upon
the United States to grant Salvadoran refugees temporary shelter which "is in no way a type
of amnesty, nor does it replace applications for political asylum. It simply permits refugees
from El Salvador to remain temporarily in the United States until the situation in their
home country improves sufficiently to allow them to return and reside there safely." Id. This
resolution was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary for consideration. It was
included in the version of the 1983 Reform Act adopted by the House Judiciary Committee.
See H.R. 1510, supra note 168, § 401, H.R. REP. No. 115, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 30.
'8s Scanlan, Issue Summaries Submitted to the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy, in STAFF OF THE SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, app. c, 43, 74 (1981).
'8 Id. at 72, 74. But see supra notes 7 and 182 (discussing refusal of United States to
grant extended voluntary departure to Salvadorans despite civil war in that country).
18 Id. at 72-73; U.S. Refugee Programs: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1980)(statement of Ingrid Walter)[hereinafter cited as 1980
Hearings on U.S. Refugee Programs].
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an assurance that no order of deportation will be enforced during
the prescribed period. 8 6 Aliens granted extended voluntary depar-
ture are denied travel documents, their work opportunities are lim-
ited, and many remain separated from their families.18 7 In effect,
the alien is left in a juridical limbo.188 Also, extended voluntary
departure can further a policy of denying asylum applicants a fair
opportunity to prove their status which they have the right to as-
sert.1'8 That is, extended voluntary departure may simply be
granted to avoid a politically embarrassing asylum decision with-
out regard to the validity of the applicant's claim."90 Conversely,
extended voluntary departure may allow applicants with frivolous
claims to remain in the country almost indefinitely.' 9
C. Displaced Persons and Refugee Policy
An adequate solution to the problem of displaced persons in the
United States calls for a compromise between a traditional human-
itarian commitment to the world's homeless and a need to main-
tain control over refugee admissions."s2 In recent years, the arrival
of large numbers of aliens has forced many to realize that there are
limits on the ability of the United States to absorb newcomers. 98
It may be argued that to extend protection and assistance to dis-
placed persons-a group which, theoretically, could include the en-
tire population of a country experiencing civil upheaval, provided
it could reach the United States" -would be to ignore these lim-
1" 1980 Hearings on U.S. Refugee Programs, supra note 185, at 42.
167 Id.
I" Scanlan, supra note 183, at 29; see also Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816
Before the Subcomm. on International Operations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1979)(statement of Dale Swartz) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Refugee
Act Hearings]. The status of "'extended voluntary departure' renders a person in the
United States 'under color of law.'" Id. This means that the alien is eligible for some, but
not all, federally funded social services and would be eligible for work authorization where
need was demonstrated. Id.
189 1979 Refugee Act Hearings, supra note 188.
19o REFUGEE POLICY GROUP, supra note 176, at 29.
191 See S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1983).
I's Id. See also Hearings on Mass Asylum, supra note 8, at 70-73 (prepared statement of
Senator Huddleston). It has been estimated that the violence in Central America could pro-
duce 1.5 to 2 million refugees. Douglas, Congressional Briefing Paper and Talking Points
on Refugees and Potential Refugees In and From Central America, reprinted in 129 CONG.
REc. S7526-27 (daily ed. May 25, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Congressional Briefing Paper].
It has also been noted that "[a) population influx of this magnitude in a short span of time
could produce social difficulties for domestic resettlement programs. Id. at S7527.
'a See supra note 152.
"4 See Letter from Alvin P. Drischler, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Rela-
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its. It may also be asserted that many displaced persons could find
refuge in other countries and, therefore, that the United States is
not a country of first asylum and has no obligation to give them
refuge. 195 Another problem which would eventually have to be con-
fronted is the practical difficulty of repatriating displaced persons
once the fighting in their homeland has stopped.""6
To be weighed in the balance against these concerns is the long-
standing commitment of the United States to persons in need of
protection and assistance. 97 Currently, the United States admits
more legal immigrants and refugees for permanent resettlement
than the rest of the world combined.198 From a purely humanita-
rian perspective, displaced persons are as deserving of protection
as many conventional refugees because they are fleeing pervasive
conditions of random violence which threaten their lives, not just
their freedom. 9 9 Also, displaced persons seek only temporary ref-
uge until the fighting stops rather than permanent resettlement,
which lessens the strain on local communities and resettlement
tions, State Department, to Senator David Durenberger (Apr. 7, 1982), reprinted in 129
CONG. REC. S6925 (daily ed. May 18, 1983). The State Department has acknowledged that
"violence is an enormous problem in El Salvador and that hardly any segment of the popu-
lation is immune from this threat. The upshot of this is the fear shared by many
Salvadorans of a return to their country." At the same time, the State Department has
noted:
the majority of Salvadorans in the United States did not depart their country
solely to seek safe haven in this country. Most traveled through third countries
before entering the United States and many of them entered quite some time ago.
Other countries closer to El Salvador- Honduras, for example-have been gener-
ous in offering safe haven to Salvadorans who have fled. Thus, the United States
is not the only possible refuge, nor can it in most cases be considered the country
of first refuge.
Id.
"I See supra note 153 (once admitted to the United States, aliens are able to use proce-
dural delaying tactics to prolong their stay).
1 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 2, at 3-4.
'" S. REP. No. 62, supra note 191, at 4.
19s AMERICAN COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES FOR FOREIGN SERVICE, supra note 182, at
S8644. "It is clear . . . that the situations of El Salvador and Guatemala, like so many
others in the world, are precisely those which motivate refugee flight. That flight is a natural
and predictable response by people to escape crossfire and the danger of pervasive random
violence." Id.
'" Congressional Briefing Paper, supra note 192, at S7526-27 (estimated figures for Cen-
tral America show that refugees from the widespread violence in that region flee to Hondu-
ras, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Nicaragua, as well as the United States).
It should also be noted that, in theory, all persons actively opposed to communist govern-
ments could seek asylum in the United States under current asylum law if they could reach
the United States. However, it has not been suggested that the criterion of political persecu-
tion should be abolished because of this theoretical possibility.
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programs. In response to those who argue that, in theory, the en-
tire population of a country engaged in civil war could find refuge
in the United States, it may be observed that, in reality, many dis-
placed persons flee to other countries or remain within their own
country. 200 Finally, the United States cannot ignore that it has be-
come a country of first asylum for many displaced persons who are
seeking to join relatives.01
D. Summary and Recommendations
Displaced persons are neither able to enter the United States
through the refugee admissions procedure established by the Refu-
gee Act nor are they eligible for asylum or withholding of deporta-
tion because of a definition of refugee which is based on the notion
of political persecution.2 2 It has been suggested that this definition
could be modified along the lines of the OAU definition to include
persons fleeing civil upheaval in their country. 203 However, expan-
sion of the definition as a means of extending protection to dis-
placed persons would be ill-suited to the overall structure of the
United States refugee program and ill-tailored to the particular
needs of displaced persons. Aliens admitted to the United States
through the refugee admissions program generally become perma-
*o* AMERICAN COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES FOR FOREIGN SERVICE, supra note 182, at
S8644. It has been observed that:
The argument that Central American refugees should stay in Mexico as their first
country of asylum is based on the presumption that the refugee knows in advance
where one should or should not go. However, the nature of rapid flight precludes
such premeditation. It is overwhelmingly the case that those coming have family
relatives here in the United States. We cannot deny the logic of people going to
where their relatives are, therefore, while supporting other first asylum countries
in their efforts to cope with refugees, the United States must recognize that it has
also become a country of first asylum. It must thus be prepared to offer protection
to those fleeing persecution and civil war as our neighbors are doing both to the
south and the north.
Id.
201 See supra notes 117-22, 151-52 and accompanying text.
2" See Fragomen, supra note 48, at 68. Cf. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 99, at 4. During
the drafting of the Refugee Act, language was added to the definition of refugee by the
Senate Judiciary Committee to include a person within his country of nationality displaced
by military or civil disturbance or uprooted because of arbitrary detention and who is una-
ble to return to his usual place of abode. Id. It was argued that this language created the
potential for "long lines of refugee applicants at U.S. posts abroad who are not really refu-
gees." 125 CONG. REC. 37,201 (1979)(statement of Rep. Fascell). This language was later
rejected by the Conference Committee in favor of language which restricted internally dis-
placed persons to those specifically designated by the President in consultation with Con-
gress. See H.R. REP. No. 781, supra note 126, at 19.
"3' See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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nent residents204 and are channeled into permanent resettlement
programs.20 Many displaced persons might accept an offer of per-
manent resettlement in the United States, but their most critical
need is for temporary protection until hostilities cease in their
homeland. Recent mass influxes of refugees have revealed that the
ability of domestic communities to absorb large numbers of aliens
is limited.20 " The existing opportunities for permanent resettle-
ment should be reserved for aliens in need of permanent protection
rather than for displaced persons. Expansion of the definition of
refugee would also be undesirable in the context of asylum and
withholding of deportation. Allowing a new category of aliens to
become eligible for these forms of relief would create difficulties
even under the streamlined asylum process set forth in the 1983
Reform Act.
Parole and extended voluntary departure are the forms of relief
currently available to displaced persons under United States refu-
gee law. 207 They are well-adapted to the needs of displaced persons
since they may be used to extend temporary protection to large
groups of aliens. However, the decision of whether to parole aliens
into the country or to grant extended voluntary departure often
rests on political considerations rather than on an objective assess-
ment of the actual conditions from which the displaced persons are
fleeing.208 Also, displaced persons who are allowed to take tempo-
rary refuge in the United States find themselves faced with uncer-
tain legal status and few clearly defined rights.20 9
Future modification of the parole power and extended voluntary
departure could make United States refugee law more responsive
to the plight of displaced persons. First, the decision of whether to
exercise the parole power or to grant extended voluntary departure
should be based on reports solicited from impartial, humanitarian
organizations such as the UNHCR in order to insulate the decision
from political bias. Second, the alien should be accorded a formal
legal status while within the United States. The list of basic rights
to be accorded asylum-seekers which has been formulated by the
Executive Committee of the UNHCR could provide guidelines in
this regard. Third, once the civil conflict has ceased in the alien's
'" See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
'o' See supra note 192.
206 See supra notes 123-26, 176-82 and accompanying text.
SOY See supra notes 128-30, 182 and accompanying text.
," See supra notes 131-32, 185-87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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home country, he should be repatriated. Opportunities to apply for
asylum should be limited by means of an administrative screening
process which prevents applicants with tenuous claims from re-
maining in the United States. Finally, efforts should be directed
toward negotiating burden-sharing agreements with other coun-
tries in order to alleviate the burden on domestic programs. These
changes would offer greater protection to displaced persons while
recognizing that their situation is generally temporary and does
not call for permanent resettlement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Persons forced to flee their homeland due to civil strife have tra-
ditionally been denied protection and assistance under interna-
tional refugee law; refugee status with its attendant benefits was
reserved for those able to establish a well-founded fear of deliber-
ate persecution. In recent years, a new legal framework has evolved
at both the international and regional levels, reflecting changes in
the nature and causes of refugee movements. Uprootedness, not
ideology, is the criterion embraced by both the UNHCR and the
OAU for the purpose of identifying those in need of protection.
Consequently, persons seeking relief from the crossfire of a civil
war are no longer at the mercy of technical distinctions divorced
from the realities of modern refugee crises. Currently, effort in the
international arena is being directed toward developing the con-
cept of temporary refuge. It is hoped that states anxious to avoid
the political connotations of asylum might be willing to grant tem-
porary refuge to persons in need of relief. Displaced persons, seek-
ing shelter until the fighting stops, would certainly benefit from
acceptance of this emerging concept.
United States refugee law does not reflect these developments.
Although an improvement over previous legislation, the Refugee
Act fails to address the plight of displaced persons seeking refuge
in the United States. Patterned after the language of the 1951
Convention, the 1980 legislation lacks the flexibility needed to cope
with recent refugee crises. Even available remedies are often ad-
ministered on the basis of political considerations, resulting in the
further detachment of United States refugee law from its humani-
tarian underpinnings. Also, the procedural due process which the
asylum process accords to those seeking refuge in the United
States does not solve the true problem of displaced per-
sons-substantive provisions of the law which reserve protection
for those who are fleeing from targeted persecution.
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Parole and a grant of extended voluntary departure are the cur-
rent alternatives to the refugee admissions process, asylum, and
withholding of deportation. Future modification of these forms of
relief could result in statutory devices which meet the need of dis-
placed persons for temporary protection and avoid placing a
greater burden on permanent resettlement programs in the United
States. First, the decision of whether to extend relief should be
based on objective reports solicited from impartial, humanitarian
organizations. Second, the alien should be accorded a formal legal
status while within the United States. Finally, burden-sharing
agreements should be negotiated with other countries. These
changes would enable the United States to both continue a tradi-
tion of helping the world's homeless and maintain necessary limits
on the number of aliens allowed to resettle in the United States.
David Hull
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